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BRINGING IN THIRD PARTIES BY THE DEFENDANT
By DALE E. BENNETT*
T HE present trend toward a recognition of pleading rules as
means toward the expeditious and economical settlement of
legal controversies, rather than as ends in themselves, has mani-
fested itself in an elasticity and liberality of joinder unknown to
the common law. Following the equity practice, the more modern
practice acts have sought to effectuate a procedure wherein a
complete determination of all questions arising out of a common
set of facts might be determined in one suit. This has been ac-
complished by a liberalization of rules not only as to the original
joinder of parties plaintiff and defendant, but also as to the sub-
sequent addition of new parties at later stages of the action.
Under the older Code provisions, the right to bring in new parties
was limited to the plaintiff, but recent practice acts extend the
privilege to the defendant and even the court.'
In.spite of the general tendency to bring in more parties and
allow more joinder, the right of the defendant in this regard has
been exceedingly limited. Provisions for interpleader are com-
mon; but the defendant's right of recovery over in whole or in
part for the claim in litigation, whether by way of contribution,
indemnity or some cause of action in the nature of indemnity,
is ordinarily relegated to a separate action with the attendant
expense and delay. He must wait until the termination of the
principal controversy, and then, if it is unfavorable, institute his
suit against the party ultimately liable, with the ever present pos-
sibility that at such later date important witnesses may be un-
available and such party may have become judgment proof or
have left the jurisdiction. Possibly this gap in the average Prac-
tice Act is due to the inadvertent omission of the codifiers. Again
it may more plausibly be attributed to a reluctance on the part of
even our more enlightened legislators to tread too far from the
well beaten path of the common law and foist on the unsuspect-
ing plaintiff an added party not of his choosing.
*Instructor in Law, Louisiana State University School of Law, Baton
Rouge, La.
12 Clark, Cases on Pleading and Procedure 600, 601.
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VOUCHING IN
A partial relief from the double litigation of common issues
has been effected by the common practice of "vouching in" the
party liable over. Thus where the defendant may have a right
of recovery against another, he may vouch such party into court
by giving him notice of the pendency of the suit and an opportumi-
ty to assume the defense. Such judgment will then be conclusive
in a subsequent action against the vouchee, both as to the amount
and the plaintiff's right to recover.-
By means of this device the defendant has been uniformly
allowed to bring in the strict indemnitor who contracted to save
him harmless,3 and the co-surety against whom he asserts a right
of contribution. 4  In the primary-secondary liability set-up, as
where the defendant claims a right of recovery over against the
one whose negligence was the actual cause of the injury, the
voucher has been limited in characteristic common law fashion.
The rule generally followed in such cases is set out by Chief
Justice Field of the Massachusetts court in the case of Consolidated
Hand-Aliethod Lasting Machine Co. v. Bradley:'
2For an excellent resumE of the origin, scope and nature of "vouching
in," see Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendant's Rights Against Third
Parties, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 1145-1150. Also in N. Y. Cent. Ry. Co. v.
Culkeen & Sons, (1924) 249 Mass. 71, 144 N. E. 96, 98 Chief Justice Rugg
sets out a clear picture of the practice at common law.
The Georgia Civil Code contains a special provision for "vouching
in"-Georgia, Ann. Code (Park 1914) sec. 5234, enacted 1895. but it is
merely a codification of the general practice already existing at common
law. Usry v. Hines-Yelton Lumber Company, (1933) 176 Ga. 010. 168
S. E. 249, 252. See Faith v. City of Atlanta, (1887) 78 Ga. 779, 4 S. E.
3, where voucher was permitted without the aid of any special statute.
3 Boston & M. R. v. Stuart & Son Co., (1920) 236 Mass. 98, 127 N. E.
532. railway vouches in contractor which had agreed to indenunify for any
injuries caused by its negligence in eliminating grade crossing; N. Y. Cent.
Ry. Co. v. Culkeen & Sons, (1924) 249 Mass. 71, 144 N. E. 96, defendant
primarily liable for fire damage vouched in warehouse company on latter's
covenant to indemnify-court citing long list of Massachusetts decisions;
McArthor v. Ogletree, (1908) 4 Ga. App. 429, 61 S. E. 859, vouched in
contractor agreeing to be responsible for damage due to negligence in repairs,
also brought in contractor's bondsman; Taylor v. Allen, (1908) 131 Ga. 416,
62 S. E. 291, grantor who had warranted title vouched in by grantee sued
in ejectment.
4Gibson v. Love, (1849) 2 Fla. 599 (co-sureties on note).
3(1898) 171 Mass. 127, 50 N. E. 464, 467. The machine company sued
for death of its employee caused by defective electric apparatus, served
notice on-its lessor through whose failure to keep the lights in repair as he
had contracted to do the accident had occurred. The court refused to treat
the judgment in the original suit as conclusive on the lessor. Field, C. J.,
emphasized the fact that the machine company was tnder a special statutory
obligation to see that the works and machinery in its plant were not de-
fective, and so was defending against some negligence of its own in the
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"If a party is obligated to defend against the act of another
against whom he has a remedy over, and defends solely and ex-
clusively the act of such other party, and is compelled to defend
no misfeasance of his own, he may notify such party of the pen-
dency of the suit, and may call upon him to defend it .... It [the
right to call in the party liable over] does not, however, apply to
cases where one is defending his own wrong or his own contract
although another may be responsible to him."
Although the test enunciated in that decision may be character-
ized as mere dictum, 6 it has been followed and its technicality am-
plified in other jurisdictions. In these decisions emphasis has
been placed upon the requirement that the defendant must be
defending solely against the wrongful act of the vouchee,- and a
strict-interpretation of such terms as "germane to the controversy"
and '"common issues" has virtually resulted in a requirement of
identical causes of action and defenses.8
original suit and damages were assessed according to the degree of its
(not the lessor's) culpability. That the injured employer's right to re-
cover against the machine company and the latter s right ot recovery
over against the lessor were for the same amounts and based on substan-
tially (if not identically) the same set of facts was apparently considered
of little consequence.6 The notice to the lessor was held insufficient to bind him by the judg-
ment, because it did riot offer to surrender control of the defense. The
court then hypothetically assumed a sufficient notice and formulated the
rule quoted supra.7Lord and Taylor v. Yale and Towe Mfg. Company, (1920) 230 N. Y.
132, 129 N. E. 346, employer sued for injury to employee, served notice on
contractor installing defective apparatus. Held, judgment against employer
not res adjudicata in action over because action was based on employer's
negligence in failure to inspect appliance having hard and constant use.
Sin Raleigh & G. R. Co. v. Western A. R. Co., (1909) 6 Ga. App. 616,
65 S. E. 586, although the decision might be justified on the ground of in-
sufficiency of common questions of fact, it enunciated a requirenent of
identity of defenses (p. 589)" which has been carried beyond all reason in
the recent Georgia case of Usry v. Hines-Yelton Lumber Company, (1933)
176 Ga. 616, 168 S. E. 249. There a purchaser of timber rights being sued
by the landowner for damages and an injunction was not allowed to vouch
in his vendor who had breached a covenant to keep a lease of the timber-
land in force, so that the defendant became a trespasser in cutting the
timber. Without any attempt to evaluate the common issues that would
be determined, a requirement of identity of defenses %as set up, following
the Raleigh and Machine Company Cases. Compare the earlier decision
in Taylor v. Allen, (1908) 131 Ga. 416, 62 S. E. 291.
A situation where "vouching in" has been pretty generally allowed is that
of a municipality being held liable for an injury caused by a property own-
er's negligent act. Phila. v. Reading Company, (19-9) 295 Pa. St. 183,
145 Atl. 65, defective sidewalk; Brookville Borough v. Arthurs, (1890) 130
Pa. St. 501, 18 Atl. 1076, same; Byne v. Mayor, etc., of Americus, (1909)
6 Ga. App. 628, 64 S. E. 284, wooden shed over sidewalk collapsed injuring
boy, original suit settled question that shed defectively constructed and
accident not due to negro boys pushing awning down while playing on
sidewalk; Faith v. City of Atlanta, (188/) 78 Ga. 779, 4 S. E. 3. negligent
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In addition to the arbitrarily imposed limitations as to the
scope of application of the common law "vouching in," the device
also fell far short of adequate relief, either from the defendant's
viewpoint or from the broader viewpoint of trial convenience, in
that it did not prevent the second suit. The defendant, even when
the voucher was permitted, must turn around and bring a separate
action against his vouchee for recovery over. This ordinarily
involved a delay of several months, and in one case the defendant
did not secure its judgment until seven years after judgment had
been rendered against itf
Texas has only the usual statutory provision for the bringing
in of necessary and proper parties."0 Yet the courts of that state,
with their characteristic liberality, have developed an impleader
practice affording the defendant a very complete and adequate
relief. Under this procedure the defendant who has a right of
recovery over against another may have him brought in as a party
to the end that such third party will be bound by matters ad-
judicated therein, and the defendant will be enabled to secure a
judgment against him in the same suit and immediately after the
question of primary liability is decided. The Texas courts have
experienced little difficulty in allowing the defendant to implead the
party liable over, in whole or in part, whether by way of contribu-
tion,11 strict indemnity or some cause of action in the nature of
excavation in public street; Bowman v. City of Greenboro, (1925) 190
N. C. 611, 130 S. E. 502, injury by falling tree limb; Littleton v. Richard-
son, (1856) 34 N. H. 179, obstruction on highway which frightened horse;
in Guthrie v. City of Durham, (1915) 168 N. C. 573, 84 S. E. 859, it was
held to be an abuse of discretion not to bring in the property owner oil
motion of the city (defendant).9Brookville Borough v. Arthurs, (1890) 130 Pa. St. 501, 18 Atl. 1076,
(1893) 152 Pa. St. 334, 25 At. 551, lady stied city for injury sustained
as result of defective sidewalk; the city vouched in Arthurs, who was
under a statutory duty to keep the sidewalk in repair. Judgment against
the city, May Term 1886; and city's suit for recovery over brought July
29, 1887. It was not until January 1893, several procedural hurdles later,
that a final decision in favor of the city against Arthurs was secured.
'
0 Texas, Complete Statutes 1920, article 1848.
"
t Barton v. Farmers State Bank, (Tex. Comp. App. 1925) 276 S. W.
177, impleader of co-obligors on note.
Under a special provision for contribution between joint tort-feasors
on payment of a joint judgment (Texas, Ann. Stat. (Vernon, 1925) art.
2212; Acts 1917, ch. 152, sec. 1), a defendant has been allowed to implead
alleged joint tort-feasors in order to compel contribution (Lottman v.
Cuilla, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 288 S. W. 123, reversing (Tex. Civ. App.
1925) 279 S. W. 519; Gattegro v. The Parisian, (Tex. Com. App. 1932)
53 S. W. (2d) 1005, 1007) provided it can be effected without serious
delay or prejudice to the plaintiff's case (Baylor Univ. v. Bradshaw. (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 1094, 1103).
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indemnity,'1- placing the emphasis upon the "identity of proof re-
quired" in the two controversies, rather than quibbling as to the
identity of causes of action, and whether the defendant was being
held on the "same theory" upon which he sought recovery over.
This common sense attitude is exemplified in the leading case of
Skip-worth v. Hurt'3 where sureties on the bond of a county treas-
urer when sued for his misappropriation of funds were allowed
to implead the bank which had knowingly applied the county
money to payment of a debt owed it by the defaulting treasurer.
Judge Brown, in discussing the impleader, stated:
"In this case the facts are so blended and connected as to the
rights of the county against these sureties and their rights against
the bank that in the trial of the case, the fundamental fact of the
liability of Skipworth must be established in the action of the
county against the sureties, which would not bind the bank; and
if another action were brought by the sureties against the bank,
the same issue would be tried anew, whereas the determination
of that issue in this action involves but one trial."
Here and there, in other jurisdictions, decisions are to be found
where the court has been exceedingly liberal, 14 but unfortunately
2
-Johnson v. Blum, (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) 66 S. W. 461. defendant
sued for breach of warranty in deed, permitted to implead grantor with
similar covenant; Labor Bk. & Trust Company v. Adams, (Tex. Civ. App.
1930) 23 S. -W. (2d) 814, in action against drawee bank to recover amount
paid on forged indorsement, impleader of collecting bank is proper.
13(1901) 94 Tex. 322, 60 S. W. 423; followed in Nat'l Surety Co., v.
Atacosa Ice, Water & Light Co., (Tex. Coi. App. 1925) 273 S. XV. 821,
824, in suit by depositor for deposits wrongfully taken by cashier, the de-
fendant bank was allowed to make the surety company on the cashier's
bond a party and recover a judgment over against it. Powell, P. J., points
out the fact that the loss of the light company "was due solely and only
to the payment by the bank of these checks issued fraudulently by Witt
[cashier] in the company's name. Clearly if the bank owed the company
any money under the pleadings and proof of this case, it was the very
amount which Witt had wrongfully withdrawn by the process lie adopted.
. . . The very sane proof which showed a given amount due the light
company [plaintiff depositor] necessarily authorized recovery from the
surety company by the bank." He concludes, after quoting at length from
Skipworth v. Hurt, that in the case at bar ... "it seems to us that because
of Witt's connection with all the parties to the action, it was better to have
every issue between them all settled in one suit. In that way they would
confront each other and promptly pursue any questions which might arise."
'14 Miller & Barnhardt v. Gulf & Atlantic Ins. Company, (1925) 132
S. C. 78, 129 S. E. 131, held abuse of discretion not to make sheriff a party
in action on his bond for mismanagement of attached property (motion of
surety [defendant] and application of sheriff to intervene). That the sheriff
was not merely to be "vouched in" is evidenced by the emphasis placed by
the court on the factors that there could be no detriment to the plaintiff to
have a judgment against two rather than one, and it would be a serious
detriment to the surety company to have to pay the judgment and then bring
a separate action for indemnity. Peurifoy v. Mauldin, (1927) 142 S. C. 7,
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the Texas judicially developed impleader practice stands signally
alone. It is to special legislative enactments that we must turn
for relief from the cumbersome technicality of the common law.
THE ENGLISH THIRD PARTY PRACTICE
The earliest conscious attempt to essay a solution to this prob-
lem is found in the English third party practice, originally set
out in Order XVI of the Supreme Court of Judicature.Y Rule
48 of that order provided:
"Where a defendant claims to be entitled to contribution or
indemnity over against any person not a party to the action, he
may, by leave of the court or a judge issue a notice (hereinafter
called the third party notice) to that effect ... "
The person thus brought into the controversy was allowed to
take such part in the trial as should appear just and proper to
the court, to the end that he should be bound by the judgment.
In case the original defendant suffered an adverse verdict, he
corld secure a judgment over in the same suit against the im-
140 S. E. 253, surety of defaulting bank president allowed to bring in
receiver of misappropriated securities. Woods v. Lavitt, (1930) 110 Conn.
668, 149 At. 392, on defendant's motion, plaintiff ordered to make vendor
of property alleged to have been converted a party. McMillan v. Spencer,
(1926) 162 Ga. 659, 134 S. E. 921, payee of note executed without con-
sideration, added in suit against maker (emphasis placed on code sections
purporting to bring about a blending of law and equity). Hoskins v.
Hotel Randolph Company, (1926) 203 Iowa 1152, 211 N. W. 423, passenger
sued hotel company for injury in elevator and the latter vouched in the
manufacturer. The elevator company, having assumed full charge of the
defense, was held to be bound by the findings as to the defective condition
of the elevator and the plaintiff's rights to recover; it was further held to
have barred itself from denying the hotel company's rights to indemnity.
The decision is clearly out of line in requiring the vouchee to admiit the
defendant's right to recovery over as a condition of assuming tile defense,
but is possibly justified under the facts of the case, the elevator company
having conducted the defense throughout in a very prejudicial manner,
seeking to absolve itself and throw the blame on the hotel company. Judg-
ment was for the plaintiff against the elevator company and hotel com-
pany, declaring the liability to be primarily that of the elevator company.
But see J. Hogan v. Miller, (1931) 156 Va. 166, 157 S. E. 540; Johnson
v. Cullinan, (1923) 94 Okla. 246, 221 Pac. 732; Enid Oil and Pipe Line
Company v. Champlin, (1925) 113 Okla. 170, 240 Pac. 649; Owens v.
State. (1928) 133 Okla. 183. 271 P.ic. 938, 945. where under st',tnte (as
found in several states) merely providing for bringing in parties where there
was a non-joinder and not purporting to adopt the equitable procedure, the
courts laid down a strict requirement that the party brought in must be a
necessary party.
5The Annual Practice, 1924. Order XVI, rules 48-55, pp. 281 et seq.
This procedure was founded on Judicature Act. (1873) sec. 24, ss. 3. pt.
V. div. I.
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pleaded party, on proof of his right to indemnity or contribu-
tion, as the case might be.16
The true purpose of these rules, "to enable all questions be-
tween the parties interested to be tried in one action without the
necessity of instituting a second suit," was recognized by the
English Courts, 7 but considerable difficulty was encountered as
to the proper interpretation of rule 48. The words "entitled to
contribution or indemnity" had originally been followed by the
phrase "or other remedy or relief" which was subsequently omit-
ted.' 8  In view of that omission, it was held in a number of
decisions that impleader should be limited to cases of contribution
and indemnity within the narrow meaning of the old rule, namely
"where a third person has contracted to indemnify the defen-
dant."' 9  Usually, however, the courts took the liberal view that
'
0Rule 48 also sets out details as to filing and service of notice. Rule
49 provides third party must enter appearance in 8 days, and effect of
failure to do so. Rules 50 and 51 allow judgment for defendant against
third party who defaults. Rule 52 governs appearance of third party and
application for directions as to trial of question of third party's liability to
make contribution or indemnify. Rule 53 provides: "The court or a judge
upon the application mentioned in rule 52, may, if it shall appear desirable
to do so, give the third party liberty to defend the action, upon such terms
as may be just, or to appear at the trial and take such part therein as may
be just and generally order such proceedings to be taken, documents to be
delivered, or amendments to be made, and give such directions as to the
court, or judge, shall appear proper for having the question most con-
veniently determined, and as to the mode and extent in or to which the
third party shall be bound or made liable by the judgment in the action."
Rule 54 gives the court discretion as to the awarding costs. Rule 54a
provides for the third party to issue third party notice to one liable over
to him, etc. Rule 55 makes third party procedure available against a co-
defendant.
'-Coles v. Civil Service Supply Association, (1884) 26 Ch. D. 529,
53 L. J. Ch. 638.
'sThe Annual Practice, 1924 p. 281, Editor's note.
'
9 Speller v. Bristol Steam Nav. Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 96, 101. 53
L. J. Q. B. 322, defendant sued for damage to goods caused by vessel being
unseaworthy, not permitted to serve third party notice on persons from
whom vessel was hired with a warranty of seaworthiness. Pontifex v.
Foord, (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 152, 53 L. J. Q. B. 321, lessee sued for breach
of a covenant to repair not allowed to bring in sub-lessee with precisely
similar covenant; Nelson v. Empress Assurance Corp. Ltd., [1905] 2 K. B.
281, 74 L, J. K B. 699, in action on insurance policy, the defendant was not
permitted to bring in the underwriter of a policy of re-isurance covering
the same subject-matter, the court holding that the contract of re-insurance
was not one of "indemnity" within the meaning of Order XVI, rule 48;
Gowar v. Hales, [1928] 1 K. B. 191, 96 L. J. K. B. 1088, motorist sued
for damages refused permission to bring in insurance company as third
party. The court followed the rule that in an action against a motorist
the jury should not be informed that he was insured; Clover, Clayton &
Co. v. Hessler, [1925] 1 K. B. 1, 94 L. J. K. B. 42, defendant shipownwrs
not allowed to bring in underwriters who had superintended repairs that
plaintiff's cause of action was based on.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"the object of the rule was to enable the court to try once and for
all an issue of fact in which all parties are alike interested," and
allowed the impleader without more ado if substantial questions
of fact were common to the original controversy and the de-
fendant's cause of action for recovery over. 0 Again it might
work out an implied obligation to indemnify.
21
In order to escape from its apparent limitations and the re-
sulting conflict as to its application, rule 48 was altered in 1929
and couched in much broader and less ambiguous language. Its
substitute, rule 1 of Order XVIa of the Supreme Court of Judi-
cature (the new code of Third Party Procedure),--' )rovi(ds:
"Where in any action a defendant claims as against any per-
son not already a party to the action (in this Order called the 3rd
party),
(a) that he is entitled to contribution or indemnity, or
(b) that he is entitled to any relief or remedy relating to or
connected with the original subject-matter of the action and sub-
20Carshore v. N. E. Ry. Company, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 344, 347, 54
L. J. Ch. 760, action against railway company for transfer of plaintiff's
stock on forged indorsement; the railway obtained leave to serve transferee
with claim for indemnity. Fry, L. J., concludes in this very practical two
paragraph opinion: "Here all are interested in whether the transfer was a
forgery, and I think it best to try it once in the presence of all parties;"
Benecke v. Frost, (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 419, 45 L. J. Q. B. 693, action for
refusal to take shellac ordered; defendants allowed to bring in parties for
whom they had bought the shellac and who had likewise refused to accept
it as being of inferior quality (clause as to quality same in contracts be-
tween plaintiff and defendants on one hand, and defendants and third parties
on the other). Blackburn, J., states: "The very object of the Judicature
Acts seems to be tiat a question of this sort, which is one qIclhsion whether
certain shellac did or did not satisfy a certain description, should be de-
termined once for all. There was a great scandal in the possibility of
different juries giving different answers to such a question, and that was
what the Act sought to put an end to." Accord: Byrne v. Brown, (1889)
22 Q. B. D. 657, 58 L. J. Q. B. 410, 37 W. R. 592, lessee sued for covenant
to renair: impleaded person in possession of premises and under dutv as to
repairs; Eden v. Weardale Iron and Coal Company, (1887) 34 Ch. D.
223. 56 L. J. Ch. 178. 400. defendant sued for damages in respect to coal
taken from lands, served notice as indemnitor on third party who had
purported to own the coal and allowed defendant to work it; Norris v.
Beazley, (1877) 46 L. J. Q. B. 515, 31 L. T. 409, trustee impleaded comi-
pany primarily liable.
"'Eastern Shipping Company v. Quah Beng Kee, 119241 A. C. 177, 93
L. J. P. C. 72.22The Annual Practice, 1932. p. 287, Order XVIa, rule 1. (1). Aside
from this distinct change, the remainder of Order XVIa, rules 2-12, cor-
responds very closely, both in substance and phraseology, to the old pro-
visions in Order XVI, rules 49-55. Rules 7 and 8 of the new order are of
interest in that they tend to emphasize, by slight alterations, the wide
discretionary powers already given (rule 53 of old order) the trial court in
determining what part the added party is to play in the principal action and
how far he is to be bound by the adjudication therein.
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stantially the same as some relief or remedy claimed by the
plaintiff, or
(c) that any question or issue relating to or connected with
the said subject-matter is substantially the same as some question
or issue arising between the plaintiff and the defendant and should
properly be determined not only as between the plaintiff and the
defendant but as between the plaintiff and defendant and the third
party or between any or either of them, the court or judge may
give leave to the defendant to issue and serve a 'third party
notice'."
The interpretation of rule 12 of the new Order (providing for
issuance of third party notice on co-defendants) in the recent case
of In re Burford23 indicates that the new rule will undoubtedly
broaden the third party procedure so that leave to implead the
party liable over will now be given in cases sometimes considered
outside the former provision." In the Burford Case an adminis-
trator had given checks signed in blank to solicitors who filled
them out and then lost the funds through the insolvency of a
brokerage firm to which they were given for investment. The
beneficiaries sued the administrator and the solicitors to recover
the money, and the administrator moved to serve third party
notice on the solicitors asserting a claim to recovery over. The
lower court refused the motion on the ground that the relief
claimed was not "substantially the same." In reversing that
holding the Court of Appeal interpreted the rule as requiring sub-
stantial similarity of facts rather than identical remedy or relief.
"The words 'substantially the same,' " states Lord Justice Law-
rence, 
2
5
"should, I think, be interpreted as *the same in substance
though not in form,' because it is impossible that the issues be-
tween the defendant's inter se should ever be the same in form
as those between the plaintiffs and defendants. The claim hy a
defendant against his co-defendant must necessarily be a different
claim from that of the plaintiff against the defendants."
The most delightful feature of the decision is the court's refusal
to attempt the formulation of any definite rule purporting to
govern future decisions.26  Order XVIa is treated simply as a
23[1932] 2 Ch. 122, 101 L. J. Ch. 321.
24The Annual Practice 1932, Editor's notes pp. 287-292, discussion of
the effect of the new rule on cases where impleader was formerly refused.
25[1932] 2 Ch. 122, 140, 101 L. J. Ch. 321.26Lawrence, L. J., succinctly states, p. 140, "without attempting to lay
down any general rule as to what claims do or do not come within the
scope of rule 12, sub. r. 1, of Order XVIa, in my judgment the present
claim is essentially one which comes within that scope."
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procedural device to facilitate the defendant's recovery over,
rather than as a rule of substance to be litigated and relitigated
in a hollow effort at precision and definition as to its scope.
Although the English third party provisions contain a consid-
erable amount of administrative detail, it is significant that the
all-important procedural questions of what part the added party
is to play in the principal controversy and how far he shall be
bound by the judgment rendered therein are clearly and distinct-
ly left to the trial court's discretion, " guided by those vague yet
workable considerations of trial convenience and practical justice
which play so important a part in the English practice. "  'his
discretion vested in the courts has been wisely and understanding-
ly exercised with a conscious effort to balance properly the con-
flicting interests in the individual case rather than to work out a
"rule of thumb" to be indiscriminately applied. Although the
third party has been uniformly permitted to attend the trial ai-d
assist the defendant,2 he has not been given a free rein to set up
independent issues at will and take full part in the principal con-
troversy unless such direct personal defense was necessary for an
adequate protection of his interests. Thus where the defendant
had already raised all reasonable defenses so that the added party's
interests were fully protected, the latter was not allowed to harass
and delay the plaintiff by additional defenses and interrogatories.'"'
On the other hand, he was given leave to defend as to points not
raised or properly handled by the defendant ;31 and where the de-
2
7'See notes 16 and 22, supra.2 See discussion of English practice, Bennett. Alternative Parties and
the Common Law Hangover, (1933) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 36, 38-42.
29Norris v. Beazley, (1877) 46 L. J. Q. B. 515, 31 L. T. 409.
30Barton v. London and N. W. Railway Company. (1888) 38 Ch. D.
144, 150, 57 L. J. Ch. 676, in affirming an order denying a full defense to
the added party, Lord Justice Cotton declared that if the defendants had
not already properly raised all defenses and points, the court would to
doubt have given the third party leave to raise them, but "where all ma-
terial grounds of defense are fairly raised by the defendant, a plaintiff
ought not, in my opinion, to be embarrassed by a third party coming in
and saying, 'I wish to deliver a defense; I wish to administer interrogh-
tories; I wish to take the same course as if I were a defendant'." lie
further pointed out that where a defendant, as in the case at bar, was
making a bona fide defense he would always be glad to avail himself of any
evidence or defenses called to his attention by third parties.
3'Withani v. Vane, (1880) 49 L. J. Ch. 242, 41 L. T. 729; Eastern
Shipping Company v. Quah Beng Kee. [1924] A. C. 177, 93 L. J. P. C.
72, usual order obtained to effect that the third party should be at liberty
to defend and appear at the trial, and should be bound by the judgment,
and might raise points of defense not raised by the defendant company.
The decision in Byrne v. Brown. (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 657, 58 L. J. Q. B.
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fense was entirely neglected, he was allowed to take full charge. "
As an added precaution, for the protection .of the plaintiff from
unnecessary delay, the question of liability over, which is only
of importance to the defendant and the added party, was kept
separate and distinct-being tried subsequent to the principal con-
troversy.33 The flexibility of the English decisions and their free-
dom from fine-spun common law disquisitions is further illustrated
by the case of Eden v. Weardale Iron & Coal Company" , where
the court experienced little difficulty in holding the impleaded
party, an "opposite party" or a "defendant" for certain purposes1
in giving full effect to the impleader practice, and yet not a defen-
dant within the general meaning of the word.3G
THIRD PARTY PROVISION'S IN A.MERICAN STATES
A relatively small number of our states, recognizing the patent
inadequacy ot the common law device of "vouching in," have en-
acted provisions, patterned either directly or indirectly after the
English third party practice.37 An examination of these statutes
410, 37 W. R. 592, where the third party was baldly denied leave to defend,
in face of its claim that the original defendant had failed to raise all feasible
defenses, was possibly unduly strict. For a more liberal view on similar
facts, see Benecke v. Frost, (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 419, 45 L. J. Q. B. 693,
where the third party was given leave to appear by counsel and defend
the action "as they may be advised" on the common question as to the
quality of shellac furnished, but upon no other question. Under the order
in this case it appears that the added defendant's part in the trial woulo
depend on the adequacy of the defense by the original defendant.
3
'-Callender v. Wallingford, (1884) 53 L. J. Q. B. 569, Lord Coleridge,
C. J., states: "Rule 53 puts it beyond doubt that the Court or a Judge, if it
shall appear desirable, may give the third party liberty to defend the action
-that'is, in fact, may put him in the place of the defendant. It is obvious
that there may be cases where even without collusion, and a fortiori with
collusion, it may not suit the defendant to defend, and in sud cases I think
the third party should be allowed to take his place. In this case, therefore,
I think the third party should have general leave to defend."33Coles v. Civil Service Supply Ass'n, (1884) 26 Ch. D. 529, 53 L. J.
Ch. 638; Eden v. Weardale Iron and Coal Company, (1887) 34 Ch. D.
223, 56 L. J. Ch. 178, 400.
34(1887) 34 Ch. D. 223, 56 L. J. Ch. 178, 400.35 So treated for purposes of entitling the plaintiff to interrogate then
and vice versa under Order XXXI, r. 1. (the order in that case had been
very liberal to the third parties permitting them "to appear at the trial of
this action and to oppose the plaintiff's claim so far as they might be
affected thereby, and to put in oral and documentary evidence and to cross-
examine witnesses.")
36Cotton, L. J., pointing out that the third parties were not defendants
within the general meaning since the plaintiff could not get judgment
against them. Accord, Edison and Swan Electric Company v. Holland,
(1889) 41 Ch. D. 28, 58 L. J. Ch. 524.
37In addition to third party provisions in New York, Wisconsin and
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and the decisions interpreting them as to their operation and
scope raises a substantial query as to their success.
NEW YORK
In New York, see 193 (2) of the Civil Practice Act, generally
conceded to have been at least suggested by the English rules,"
was introduced in 1922.39 The new provision was originally con-
strued in a very narrow manner due largely, so it was stated, 41, to
the interpretation of the word "must" in the statute as making the
impleader a matter of right rather than exercise of judicial dis-
cretion. Fearful lest by their liberality in a particular instance
they might establish a precedent which would prove burdensome
to plaintiffs in later cases, the courts limited the right of impleader
to cases of liability over by way of contribution or indemnity in the
strictest sense of the word.
41
Pennsylvania, which will be discussed, infra., such enactments are also
found in Louisiana, Code of Practice (Dart 1932), art. 378-388; Iowa,
Code 1933, sec. 11, 155; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, sec. 54, p. 1339. For a
discussion of impleader practice in federal admiralty jurisdiction, and
English dominions having statutory authorization, sec Cohen, Inpleader
Practice, (1933) 33 'Col. L. Rev. 1147, 1169, 1182.
3SLewis H. May Company v. Mott Avenue Corporation, (1923) 121
Misc. Rep. 398, 201 N. Y. S. 189. Cropsey, J., states, "Although the notes
do not give credit to the English practice rules, as the origin of this amend-
ment, it seems quite obvious that they at least furnish the suggestion;"
also see Neuss Hesslcin & Company v. National Aniline & Chemical Com-
pany, (1923) 120 Misc. Rep. 164, 197 N. Y. S. 808.
39Laws 1922, ch. 624.
"°May Company v. Mott Avenue Corporation, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep.
398, 201 N. Y. S. 189, Cropsey, J., in limiting impleader to case of strict
indemnity or contribution, says "I cannot believe it was intended to pernit
a third party to be brought in upon the application of the defendant merely
because the defendant has a claim against him the determination of whic
involves some of the same facts involved in the plaintiff's claim. And this
construction, it would seem, should not be given unless absolutely required
because by the terms of the amendment the court 'must' direct the third
person to be brought in."
41May Company v. Mott Avenue Corporation, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep.
398, 201 N. Y. S. 189, vendor of real estate sued for commissions not al-
lowed to bring in purchaser who would be liable over because of his repre-
sentation that there was no broker in the transaction; New Netherland
Bank of New York v. Goodman, (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term N. Y. County
1923) 201 N. Y. S. 188, suit for failure to return skins delivered to be
dressed and dyed, defendant's motion to bring in party to whom he claims
to have delivered them denied. Neuss Hesslein & Company v. National
Aniline & Chemical Company, (1923) 120 Misc. Rep. 164, 197 N. Y. S. 808.
Action for damages caused by impurities in beer coloring sold by defendant.
On ground that claims were "largely unrelated," the defendant's motion
to bring in party who sold it the coloring so as to assert a claim against
such party was denied.
But see Fedden v. Brooklyn, (1923) 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N. Y. S. 9,
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To escape the limitations of the early decisions, Section 193
(2) was amended in 1923, the word "must" being changed to
"may," so as to make the matter clearly discretionary with the
court.42 With the decision of the Irwin Case"3 immediately follow-
ing this change, it appeared that the New York judiciary were
likely to defeat the legislative purpose by self-imposed restraints
in the exercise of their newly acquired discretion. In that case a
defendant who was sued for damages resulting from his chauf-
feur's negligence sought to implead the chauffeur, an ideal situa-
tion for the application of section 193 (2). The motion was denied
on the ground that there was no showing of merit in the appli-
cation.
In subsequent opinions, however, the courts have appeared to
sense the real significance of the change and, with a wholesome
emphasis on the purely discretionary nature of their power, have
sought to apply the equitable principles intended by the codiliers.
Judge Taylor of the appellate division declared in Ilej.a v. A'
York Central Railway Company :4'
"Not only the promotion of expedition and the curtailing of
expenses in litigation, but the trend of authority speak for a liberal
construction of this statute, that it be given a stope as wide as is
consonant with due regard for the rights of plaintiffs to proceed
promptly."
The court cited the broad construction of similar provisions by
master being sued for his servant's negligent act allowed to bring in the
servant.
2Sec. 193 (2) N. Y. Civil Practice Act, as amended by New York,
laws 1923, ch. 250, provides:
"Where any party to an action shows that some third person, not then
a party to the action, is or will be liable to such party wholly or in part
for the claim made against such party in the action, the court, on applica-
tion of such party, may order such person to be brought in as a party to
the action and direct that a supplemental suiimons and a pleading alleging
the claim of such party against such person be served upon such person
and that such person plead thereto, so that the claim of such moving party
against such person may be determined in such action, which shall there-
upon proceed against such person as a defendant therein to such judgment
as may be proper."
In Irwin v. N. Y. Telephone Company, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 642, 202
N. Y. S. 81, Judge Hazarthy says, in speaking of the change of the word
"must" to "may," that the change "is of vital importance" and that "the
legislature did mean to invest the court with discretion, and that discretion
was meant to be exercised in each particular case."
43(1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 642, 202 N. Y. S. 81.
44(1930) 230 App. Div. 624, 246 N. Y. S. 34, impleader of a lessee who
had agreed to indemnify his lessor for the claim sued on. Accord, Driscoll
v. Corwin, (1929) 133 Misc. Rep. 788, 233 N. Y. S. 483, surety company
brought in as indemnitor.
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the Wisconsin and English courts and the statement by Clark in
his treatise on Code Pleading 45 that, "It would seem that the rule
[here under consideration] should be more broadly applied without
such meticulous spelling out of the supposed statutory require-
ments." This practical attitude is evidenced in decisions permitting
the impleader of prior indorsers on a forged check paid by defend-
ant bank,46 parties assuming the obligations of notes sued on, 47 an
undisclosed principal, 48 a prior grantor whose deed had contained
warranties similar to those made by the defendant,"" an employee
of the defendant whose negligence in procuring insurance caused
the plaintiff's loss,30 the railway responsible at least in part for loss
due to delay in forwarding goods,"' and an independent contractor
whose negligent act created the dangerous condition of the prei-
ises.52 In Day v. 5th Avenue and 43rd Street Building Corpora-
tion5 3 the trial court's refusal to allow an application to bring in the
party primarily liable was reversed by the appellate division as an
abuse of discretion. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff was
not objecting to the defendant's motion, indicating that it was not
for his protection or convenience that the impleader had been
refused.
On the other hand, in several of the more difficult cases, the
courts have resorted to technicalities to justify decisions which,
if justifiable at all, could best be explained in terms of judicial
discretion. In Krombach v. Killian,5 4 the owner of certain preni-
45At p. 286.
46Kleinman v. Chase National Bank, (1924) 124 Misc. Rep. 173, 207
N. Y. S. 191.
47Williams v. Tompkins, (1924) 211 App. Div. 17, 206 N. Y. S. 637.4SFed. Lighterage Company v. Italia-Amer. Shipping Corporation,
(1925) 125 Misc. Rep. 181, 210 N. Y. S. 458.
49Municipal Service Company v. D. B. & M. Holding Corporation.
(1931) 257 N. Y. 423, 178 N. E. 745. Accord: Bozzuffi v. Darricusecq,
(1925) 125 Misc. Rep. 178, 210 N. Y. S. 455, when the sub-lessee, on can-
cellation, sued to recover a deposit for faithful performance, the defendant
(original lessee) was allowed to bring in the lessor who had cancelled
the lease and with whom he had posted a like sum as security.
5OTravlos v. Commercial Union of America, (1926) 217 App. Div.
352, 217 N. Y. S. 459.
5 tWichert v. Gallagher and Ascher, (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term N. Y.
County 1923) 201 N. Y. S. 186.
52Hailfinger v. Meyer, (1925) 215 App. Div. 35, 212 N. Y. S. 746.
53(1930) 231 App. Div. 89, 246 N. Y. S. 380, owner of building, being
sued for death of workman in its construction, applied to bring in two of
contractors engaged in erection of the building, who, if anyone, were liable
for the alleged negligence. Contractors had also agreed to indemnify the
owner from such claims.
:"(1925) 215 App. Div. 19, 213 N. Y. S. 139, 140.
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ises, on being sued by a guest who had slipped on a stairway,
sought to bring in an insurance company liable to him under a
policy covering such risks (the insurance company had disputed
sufficiency of the notice to it). The reversal of the lower court's
order bringing in the insurance company might easily have been
justified on the basis of resulting prejudice to the insurance com-
pany by the disclosure of its interest in the case to the jury. This
consideration the court merely alluded to, choosing to "go tech-
nical" and limit the benefits of section 193(2) to cases where
there is an absolute or present liability over," a rule which if
uniformly applied would virtually emasculate the New York pro-
vision.
The finishing touches on the judicial strait-jacket for section
193 (2) were applied by the New York court of appeals in
Nichols v. Clark, MacMullen and Riley.-" An action had been
brought against certain consulting engineers for defective plans
and work in the reconstruction of a heating system, resulting in a
fire which had destroyed the plaintiff's house and its contents.
The engineers were charged with negligence in recommending the
use of celotex as a non-inflammable covering and insulation for
hot air pipes, when it was in fact inflammable. They sought to
bring in the celotex manufacturer as a defendant, alleging that it
had recommended and advertised its product as insulating. mate-
rial for covering hot and cold air ducts and would be liable over
if they were mulcted in damages for using celotex. The refusal
to allow the joinder of the Celotex Company might have been
explained on the sole ground that no prima facie case of liability
over had been established by the defendant's allegations,17 but
5
-"The provisions of the section," states Kelby, J., "are limited to a
person who 'is or will be liable.' 'Will be' camot arbitrarily be changed to
'may be.' The Insurance Company is not presently liable. It may here-
after be liable; but such liability will not accrue, unless and until a judg-
ment shall have been obtained against the owners, and the owners shall
have fully satisfied such judgment by a payment 'in money.' And even
after the payment of such judgment by the owners, there would still remain
for determination the disputed question of the service of due notice."
Similarly in Hotel Antlers v. Standard Oil of N. Y., (1923) 144 Misc. Rep.
781, 259 N. Y. S. 351, the court refused joinder of a party alleged to be
solely liable for the negligent act as an independent contractor or liable
over to the defendant if the court found him to be a servant and the doc-
trine of "respondeat superior" applicable so as to enable plaintiff to recover
against the defendant. The court appeared bothered by the allegation of
liability over in the alternative.
56(1933) 261 N. Y. 118, 184 N. E. 729.
57The court discussed the insufficiency of the defendant's allegations of
liability over, but it is evident from other parts of the opinion that had the
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such a practical disposal of the matter did not satisfy the court's
penchant for definite interpretation. Judge Crane sought addi-
tional reasons to justify the decision, and held that the cause of
action against the Celotex Company was not identical with the
one against the defendant, which contained allegations of negli-
gence in designing the heating system as well as in the use of
Celotex as an insulating material. He declared:
"All these allegations are contained in one cause of action.
Upon the trial the proof may go in under any of the allegations,
for some of which the 'Celotex' might be responsible and for some
of which the engineers solely responsible. A judgment against
these defendant's engineers, upon such allegations would not be
binding upon the Celotex Company or, to state it more accurately,
the Celotex Company would not be liable over to the engineers
on a judgment recovered against them based upon such proof....
The object is to prevent a circuity of action. The determination of
the facts to be tried will settle both claims. The causes of action
must, therefore, be the sawme or, at least, based upon the samc
grounds, although arising, of course, out of different relationships."
While it is true that the decision against the engineers might
be predicated entirely on negligence in designing the heating plant,
partly on such negligent designing and partly on the use of
celotex, or wholly on the use of celotex, the jury determining the
primary question of their liability is best fitted to determine the
related question as to the ultimate basis of such liability. Other-
wise, although the original jury's finding of negligence be based
entirely on the use of celotex, another jury in a separate suit for
recovery over might take an opposite slant on the facts and refuse
to allow recovery over against the Celotex Company on the theory
that the fire was due entirely to negligence in designing the heat-
ing unit. Such an anomalous result is clearly possible, to say
nothing of the fact that two trials, two juries and two examina-
tions of witnesses are required where one would clearly have
sufficed.
By his attempt to define and apply that elusive term "cause
of action" as a purely technical concept, Judge Crane places an
unfortunate interpretation on section 193 (2), limiting its bene-
fits to that narrow line of cases where the impleaded party will
be liable on the judgment rendered against the original defendant.
Under the modern conception of "factual" rather than "label"
pleading, it appears unnecessary to talk in terms of "causes of
liability over, in case the use of celotex caused the fire, been clearly establish-
ed, the impleader would still have been refused.
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action;" but if such terminology must be employed, a much hap-
pier result may be reached by the application of Clark's pragmatic
and common sense treatment of the cause of action as "an aggre-
gate of operative facts, a series of acts or events, which gives
rise to one or more legal relations of right-duty enforceable in the
courts." s
In matters of procedure, once the third party is brought in,
the New York Courts have prevented any real serving of trial
convenience by their reluctance to abandon the ancient legal idea
of a two party action-an action exclusively between plaintiff
and defendant. Following the lead of Judge Lehman's lengthy
opinion in Muniipal Service Company v. D. B. & Al. Holding
Corporation,59 they have uniformly held that unless the original
defendant turns over the defense (presumably by going through
the old process of "vouching in") the impleaded party has no
right to take any part in the proceedings between the plaintiff
and defendant, but must confine his activities to listening care-
fully and answering the supplemental pleadings of the defendant."°
Consequently, the facts decided in the main controversy are not
final as to him, but must be relitigated in the action for recovery
over-the only effect of the impleader being to provide for the
joint trial of the two controversies. 6
Nor does the fact that the defendant may still bind the im-
pleaded party by turning over the entire defense to him adequately
meet the situation. For example, in the Nichols Case, while there
are important common questions of fact which make the impleader
advisable, there are also questions solely between the plaintiff and
defendant with which the added party is in no way concerned.
5 5Clark, The Code Cause of Action, (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 817, 828;
Clark, The Cause of Action, (1934) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 354.
59(1931) 257 N. Y. 423, 178 N. E. 745.
60Municipal Service Company opinion quoted at length and followed
in: Marsh v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., (1931) 141 Misc. Rep. 484, 252 N.
Y. S. 206, third party's counter-claim against plaintiff's complaint stricker
out on ground that his pleadings in defense must be directed solely against
the supplemental pleadings of the original defendant; Fenner v. Kahn(1933) 146 Misc. Rep. 210, 261 N. Y. S. 528, 533, dictum that added de-
fendant cannot counter-claim against the plaintiff. See also, Travlos v
Commercial Union of America, (1930) 135 Misc. Rep. 895, 238 N. Y. S
692, holding impleaded party could not answer or otherwise plead in respect
to the plaintiff's complaint.61In the Municipal Service Company Case, (1931) 257 N. Y. 423, 178
N. E. 745, the court points out that where the indemnitor is not offered
the opportunity to defend the original suit, the judgment therein is not
binding on him and thus he is not prejudiced by the original defendant's
feeble defense.
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The true solution, afforded by the English practice, is to give
the added party control of those issues upon which his liability
over depends, provided the original defendant is not making an
adequate defense. In case of a strict indemnitor it might mean a
complete assumption of the defense. In the Nichols Case set-ulI---
only on the question as to whether the fire was caused by the use
of Celotex. This is not a matter to be governed by any categori-
cally stated set of rules. It is a matter to be pragmatically worked
out with reference to the peculiar facts of the individual case.
NEW YORK-SECTION 211A
Inseparably connected with section 193 (2) of the New York
Civil Practice Act is section 211a.12 Prior to its enactment in
1928, the New York courts had followed the unsatisfactory though
generally accepted rule that there was no right of contribution
among joint tort-feasors in pari delicto, and consequently refused
to allow the impleader of such parties, 3 unless the plaintiff acqui-
esced in the motion.64 The new section purported to alter the
harsh common rule and enable the defendant to secure contribu-
tion from his co-tort-feasors. It provided for contribution
"where a money judginent has been recovercd jointly against two
or more defendants in an action for a personal injury or for prop-
erty damage, and such judgment has been paid in part or in full
by one or more of such defendants ... "
The purpose of the legislators to give the joint tort-feasor a
substantial right of contribution was fully grasped by Judge
Crouch of the appellate division in Haines v. Bero Engineering
Corporation.6' In that case, a corporation being sued for an injury
caused by the alleged negligence of one of its truck drivers was
permitted to bring in, for the purpose of securing contribution,
the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was riding when the
collision took place; Judge Crouch summarily dismissed all tech-
nical objections arising from a strict construction of the unfortu-
nate wording of section 21 la, and pointed out that unless impleader
was permitted under section 193 (2) the joint tort-feasor's right
62Added by Laws 1928, ch. 714, in effect September 1, 1928.
63Greenhouse v. Rochester Taxicab Company. (1926) 218 App. Div. 224.
218 N. Y. S. 167, aff'd (1927) 244 N. Y. 559, 155 N. E. 896.
64Fisher v. Bullock, (1923) 204 App. Div. 523, 198 N. Y. S. 538, aff'd
(1923) 237 N. Y. 542, 143 N. E. 735, treating the defendant's motion, in
effect, as if the plaintiff were applying to bring in the third party.
65(1930) 230 App. Div. 332, 243 N. Y. S. 657.
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of contribution would not be a substantive right, but merely a
will-o'-the-wisp depending solely on the election of the plaintiff to
sue jointly. This liberal and common sense decision, interpreting
sections 193 (2) and 211a together, apparently settled the matter
in the appellate division, and a very liberal practice was evolved."
Then came the case of Fox v. Western New York Aotor Lines.
The trial court had allowed a defendant bus company to implead
the driver and owner of a truck in which plaintiff was riding when
the injuries complained of were sustained. The bus company
alleged such third party was at least jointly at fault in causing
the collision. The plaintiff made no objection to the impleader,
but the added defendant moved to vacate the order bringing him
in. The appellate division, following its previous decision in the
Haines Case, upheld the order adding the truck driver as a defen-
dant.6 7 Judge Sears emphasized the fact that the plaintiff's rights
were unaffected by bringing in the joint tort-feasor, and declared
in reference to the right of contribution under section 211a: "We
deem the right a substantial one, not merely of a phantom nature
existent or not at the whim of a plaintiff, but one which the courts
may enforce even against the will of the plaintiff, unless the plain-
tiff's own rights are thereby put in jeopardy." The court of ap-
6 6Haines Case followed in: Schenck v. Bradshaw, (1931) 233 App. Div.
171, 251 N. Y. S. 316, allowance of defendant's motion to bring in driver of
other car upheld, overruling plaintiff's objection of prejudice and delay:
Davis v. Hauck and Schmidt, (1931) 232 App. Div. 556, 250 N. Y. S. 537,
as to procedure after the joint tort-feasor is brought in, the court held tha
the plaintiff might adopt the averments of the defendant's answer as to the
added party, amend his complaint setting forth his theory as to the negligence
of all parties, or stand on his original complaint. As to possible verdicts.
the jury might defeat the plaintiff, or find against or in favor of one or
more of the defendants on the basis of all the evidence, and after judgment
rendered and payment, the respective liabilities of the defendants, one to
another, could be determined by motion without the necessity of all inde-
pendent suit with a rehearing of the evidence; La Lone v. Carlin, (1931) 139
Misc. Rep. 553, 247 N. Y. S. 665, holding that the plaintiff's covenant not
to sue the driver of the car he was in did not defeat the defendant's right
to bring in such party. (Decision favorably commented on in (1931) 16
Corn. L. Q. 598 on the ground that otherwise plaintiffs could circumvent
sec. 211a by covenanting not to sue those persons whom they did not want
held).
Contra: Rowe v. Denier, (1929) 135 Misc. Rep. 286, 238 N. Y. S. 9.
auto collision, 211a held only applicable where plaintiff has sued defendants
jointly (noted (1930) 39 Yale, L. J. 909) ; in Troshow v. Altman & Con-
pany, (1931) 140 Misc. Rep. 420, 250 N. Y. S. 599, Rowe v. Denier was
followed and the Haines Case overruled, but that decision was reversed
without opinion and the defendant's motion to bring in the joint tort-feaso'
granted by the appellate division, (1931) 234 App. Div. 664, 851, 252 N.
Y. S. 945.
67(1931) 232 App. Div. 308, 249 N. Y. S. 623.
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peals, however, reversed the appellate division 8 on the ground
that section 193 (2) does not apply "unless there is a liability over,
either through indemnity or contribution or otherwise, existing
at the thne of application." Judge Crane expressly overruled the
Haines Case line of decisions, interpreting sections 211a and 193
(2) together, and limited the newly created right of contribution
to the case where a plaintiff has originally sued joint tort-feasors
and recovered a money judgment jointly against them.
Looking at the Fox v. New York Motor Lines decision in the
abstract and from a purely technical standpoint, it is unimpeach-
able. If we view it from the common sense standpoint of whether
it carries out the true purpose of the Legislature, it is, to say the
least, unfortunate. Thus section 2 11a becomes delusive, holding
out a promise of contribution to the ear, only to disappoint the
hope. That opinion, however, has been uniformly followed in
subsequent cases and has apparently settled the scope of New
York's contribution statute. 69
Compare with it the decision of the Texas commission of
appeals in Lottman v. Cuilla, involving a similar contribution pro-
vision.7 0 In sustaining the impleader of an alleged joint tortfeasor,
Commissioner Speer set out the Texas statute and stated,1
"This clearly recognizes the principle of enforced contribution
among joint tort-feasors, thus changing the common law rule upon
that subject. It is true literally the statute applies to judgments
68(1931) 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289.
69Rothman v. Byron, (1931) 141 Misc. Rep. 770, 253 N. Y. S. 812, in
refusing to bring in operator of automobile in which plaintiff was riding,
the court held that section 211a did not confer a substantive right of con-
tribution existent prior to the entry of a money judgment and concluded,
"I am constrained to hold that the plaintiff in the case at bar, when he
elected not to sue the driver of the car in which he was riding-who was
presumably his friend-was exercising a privilege well within his legal
rights." The Fox Case was followed in Booth v. Carleton Inc., (1932)
236 App. Div. 296, 258 N. Y. S. 159; and Morbito v. Rupp, (1932) 143
Misc. Rep. 385, 256 N. Y. S. 605, 607.70(Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 288 S. W. 123. The Texas contribution
statute contains the same joint money judgment requirement which has
proved so troublesome in section 211a.
71(Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 288 S. W. 123, 126. The liberal statutory
construction in Lottman v. Cuilla was approved by Chief Justice McClendon
in Ferguson v. Johnson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 57 S. W. (2d) 372, 377.
After stating the general rule of statutory construction, that the court is
not permitted to look beyond the language employed, he declares. "lut eveni
this rule is not an altogether inflexible one; and where the literal, gram-
matical, or dictionary interpretation of the language would defeat or sub-
stantially impair effectuation of the legislative objective, the wording in
which the legislature has clothed its mandate will not be given controlling
effect."
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rendered against two or more wrongdoers. But the evident pur-
pose of the act was to relieve the rigor of the common law, so as
to place the burden, as amongst themselves, equally upon all
solvent tort-feasors. There is no reason to hold the legislature
meant to exclude from the benefits of the statute those cases where,
as here, the plaintiff did not elect to sue all the tort-feasors; but
every consideration impels us to hold that the defendant sued, may,
and should be allowed to, bring in other wrongdoers, provided he
does so in such way as not to delay or otherwise prejudice the
plaintiff's case."
Instead of setting up the contribution statute in vacuo and then
strictly and narrowly defining its terms, the Texas courts have
sought to ascertain and effectuate the real legislative purpose.
WISCONSIN -
The liberality intended in the Wisconsin third party practice
is evident both from its context and its origin. The legislature, in
1913, requested the supreme court to suggest such changes in the
court practice, "as will simplify it, relieve it of its technicalities
and promote the ends of justice, and to report their suggestions
to the legislature which convenes in 1915."--- The suggestions made
by the court pursuant to this request were embodied in chapter 219
of the laws of 1915, and included a specific provision for the bring-
ing in of parties against whom the defendant will have a right of
recovery over.
7 4
72 Prior to the enactment of a special impleader btatute, we find a
limited application of the practice under a general provision for the bring-
ing in of adverse or necessary parties by the court (Wisconsin, Stat. 1931,
sec. 260.11). See Town of Washburn v. Lee, (1906) 128 Wis. 312, 107
N. W. 649, sureties on town treasurer's bond allowed to implead parties
knowingly receiving the illegal payments. In Schmull v. Mil. E. & R. L.
Co., (1914) 156 Wis. 585, 146 N. W. 787, though Barnes, J., felt that the
lower court had made a mistake in denying the street railway company's
motion to implead the conductor for whose negligence it was being sued, he
held that the matter was purely discretionary and therefore not appealable.
73Joint Resolution No. 30, 1913.
'4Wisconsin, Statutes 1931, sec. 260.19.
(1) gives court power to bring in necessary parties.
(2) interpleader provision.
(3) "A defendant who shows by affidavit that if he be held liable in
the action he will have a right of action against a third person not a party
to the action for the amount of the recovery against him, may, upon due
notice to such person and to the opposing party, apply to the court for an
order making such third person a party defendant in order that the rights
of all parties may be finally settled in one action, and the court may in
its discretion make such order.
(4) "This section shall be liberally construed in order that, so far as
practicable, all closely related contentions may be disposed of in one action,
even though in the strict sense there be two controversies, provided the
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The Wisconsin provision has been held to be discretionary in
the largest sense of the word.71 Thus, the suprene court refused
to intervene in Ertel v. Mil. Elec. Ry. & Light Company"0 although
the trial court had clearly abused its discretion and defeated the
very purpose of the act. In that case a pedestrian, injured when a
street car collided with and threw a coal wagon against him, sued
both the street car company and the coal company for his injuries.
The trial court denied the coal company's motion to make its
driver, for whose alleged negligent act it was being held, a party de-
fendant. In affirming that ruling, Judge Rosenberry declared "that
the court properly exercised its discretion. ' 77 Fortunately, other
trial courts have been more liberal than the one in the Ertel Casc,
and have usually allowed the defendant's application, provided it
was seasonably made.78 Thus a surety has been allowed to implead
the party knowingly receiving funds misappropriated by its prin-
cipal ;71 a defendant bank to bring in indorsers on forged checks
it had cashed ;80 and a mortgagor to implead an insurance company
so that the latter might be ordered to pay the amount due for a
contentions relate to the same general subject and separate actions would
subject either of the parties to the danger of double liability or serious
hardship."
Section 260.20, pertaining to the proceedings after new parties are
brought in, adds little that should not be easily inferable from section 260.19.
75 Bell Lumber Co. v. Northern Nat'l Bk., (1920) 171 Wis. 374, 177
N. W. 616, order permitting the impleader held not appealable. Schmull
v. Mil. E. & R. L. Co., (1914) 156 Wis. 585, 146 N. W. 787, decided before
the 1915 Act, but expressing a view as to the nature of trial court discretion
which makes it practically judicial fiat with no appeal in case of abuse.
Wujcik v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Company, (1926) 189 Wis. 366, 207
N. W. 710, 712, dictum that granting of impleader is purely discretionary.
76(1916) 164 Wis. 380, 160 N. W. 263.
77 0n trial the jury found the motorman of the street car and the driver
of the coal wagon concurrently negligent and held the defendants (their
employers). That the coal company might have considerable difficulty in
establishing the driver's negligence as a basis of recovery over in a sub-
sequent action before a different jury is evidenced by the fact that in a
separate suit by the driver against the street railway company he recovered
for his injuries, the jury finding him free from negligence.
78State ex rel. Wis. Power & Lt. Co. v. Zimmerman, (1927) 194 Wis.
193, 215 N. W. 887, failure of defendant to apply until just before term
case set for trial, held sufficient ground to justify refusal.
79Brovan v. Kyle, (1917) 166 Wis. 347, 165 N. W. 382. But see State
v. U. S. Fidelity Guaranty Company, (Wis. 1933) 246 N. W. 434, refusal
to allow sureties on bank's bond to secure state deposits to implead state
treasurer who had deposited excessive amounts, so as to assert their right
of recovery over by way of subrogation against him.
80Bell Lumber Company v. Northern Nat'l Bank, (1920) 171 Wis. 374,
177 N. W. 616.
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fire loss on the mortgaged premises into court, to be applied directly
to the mortgage debt.sl
In negligence cases where the defendant seeks to bring in a
joint or concurrent tort-feasor for the purpose of enforcing his
right of contribution,"2 the Wisconsin courts have encountered
considerably more difficulty, taking the attitude in early cases that
when the added defendant was brought in a big free-for-all fight
would ensue, in the course of which the plaintiff would be delayed
and might suffer reversal due to error by the court in the inter-
defendant controversy. This attitude was forcibly illustrated in
the case of Bakula v. Schwab. 3 In that case the driver of an auto-
mobile was sued for injuries to the plaintiff when he ran his car
into a ditch in passing a buggy. He moved to bring in the driver of
the buggy which was alleged to have swerved in front of him. The
motion was granted, but at the close of the testimony the trial court
directed a verdict in favor of the added defendant. The original
defendant, after an adverse jury verdict, sought a reversal on the
ground that the court had erred in directing a verdict against the
added defendant. This, he argued, would amount to an affirmance
of such party's non-liability and thus prevent recovery in any sub-
sequent action for contribution. The supreme court, partially
influenced by the broad wording of the Wisconsin provision, could
not conceive of the third party in any other light than as a full-
fledged defendant in the controversy between the original parties,84
81Lumberman's Nat'l Bank v. Corrigan, (1918) 167 Wis. 82, 166
N. W. 650. Winslow, C. J. (a member of the 1913 Supreme Court Coin-
mittee suggesting the 1915 provisions) stated, "We regard this as a typical
case where justice demands the settling in one action of a number of con-
flicting claims, all very closely connected." After setting out facts, he
continues, "That these parties should be compelled to settle their rights
and liabilities in several separate actions, thus duplicating expense and
dragging out the controversy through a series of years, is not and never
has been the idea of our code of procedure but rather the contrary....
The idea in both sections is to enable the court to grasp all the issues
germane to the main controversy, whether arising between the plaintiff
and the defendant, or between defendants, or between a defendant and an
outside party and dispose of them in one and the same action and thus avoid
a multiplicity of suits."52Ellis v. Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co., (1918) 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W.
1048, recognizes the right to contribute between joint tort-feasors, subjec.
to certain limitations.
13(1918) 167 Wis. 546, 168 N. W. 378.
84Sec. 260.19 (3) provides that defendant may in proper case apply
for an order "making such third person a party dcfendant"-(see note 74
supra, for entire section).
Compare with Judge Owen's technical conception of the Wisconsin
provision the common sense and practical interpretation of the English
third party provisions, supra.
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any error in respect to him justifying a reversal of the plaintiff's
judgment. After pointing out the "intolerable" burden, expense
and hardship on the plaintiff of another trial, Judge Owen sought
to escape the logic of his own reasoning by holding that the issues
in the principal case were not res adjudicata in a subsequent con-
troversy between the two drivers. He treated the verdict appealed
from as though the driver of the buggy had never been made a
party and expressed the opinion that the trial court should have
exercised its discretion and denied the application."'
With a fuller realization of the proper interrelation of parties
in the impleader set-up, the difficulties confronting the court in
Bakula v. Schwab appear more imaginary than real. Judge Rosen-
berry in two subsequent decisions 6 has done much to clarify the
practice.
In Wait v. Pierce,17 the most important of these decisions, the
S3Judge Owen points out, by way of dictum (p. 382), there is no
purpose or object in bringing in the concurrent tort-feasor who may also
be liable and whose presence only adds confusion, and declares, "We see
no reason why this venerable rule [that a plaintiff may choose whom lie
will sue] should be changed, nor why the plaintiff should be compelled to
involuntarily litigate with parties not of his own choosing." Accord: Town
of Humboldt v. Schoen, (1919) 168 Wis. 414, 170 N. W. 250, town officers
sued for the unlawful expenditure of funds were not allowed to bring in
other officers participating therein. Siebecker, J., states, "The plaintiff is
not to be subjected to having such rights between defendants tried out in
its action." Bakula v. Schwab cited, and no mention made of code pro-
vision for bringing in parties liable over.
S6 The first of these decisions was Fisher v. Mil. E. R. & Lt. Co.. (1920)
173 Wis. 57, 180 N. W. 269. There a light company, being sted for negli-
gent injury to a person thrown from its car, was allowed to bring in tile
doctor whose negligence was alleged to have aggravated the injury. ald
against whom a claim for recovery over was asserted for such daniages as
were due to lack of care in treating the plaintiff. The doctor objected on
the grounds: (1) that there could be no right of recovery over until thejudgment was paid, and (2) that the light company's cause of action over
was not for the full amount of the plaintiff's recovery, the light conmpanty
admitting liability for part of the injuries. Judge Rosenberry overruled
these highly technical objections. He emphasized the fact that the ima-
pleader provision should be liberally construed in order to dispose of all
closely related matters in one action, and concluded, "The contentions
relate to the same general subject, and it is conceivable that although the
plaintiff recover against the light company for damages due to the negligence
of defendant Rumph [the doctor], a second jury might find against it upon
the issue, and the light company therefore be compelled to pay danmages.
as between it and Rumph, not justly chargeable to it, although legally liable
therefor to the plaintiff."
But see opinion of Owen, J., concurring on the ground that the trial
court's ruling was not reviewable, but emphatically decrying the giving of
the order (adhering to his former view in Bakula v. Schwab).
1-(1926) 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475 (containing facts of the case).
210 N. W. 822 (opinion as to bringing in added parties). Accord: Mitchell
v. Raymond, (1923) 181 Wis. 591, 195 N. W. 855, driver of other car
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defendants impleaded the plaintiff's husband who was alleged to
be jointly liable with them and from whom they claimed a right
to recover half of any damages awarded to the plaintiff. The
husband's technical objection that the claim against him was not
for the full anwunt of the plaintiff's recovery was practically con-
sidered and overruled, the court stating,
"While it is true that one joint tort-feasor will not have a
right of action over against his co-tort-feasor for the amount of
recovery, but only for one-half of the amount in the event that
there are two, he is certainly well within the statute, because the
whole must include an amount less than the whole."
After setting forth the facts and opinion in Bakida v. Schwab, Mr.
Justice Rosenberry says,
"Language is used in the opinion rather broader than the
issues of the case warrant. . . . To hold under such circumstances
that a judgment which establishes the common liability is not
res adjudicata upon that question is to ignore the principle upon
which the right to contribution rests. In the Bakula Case, supra,
there was no cross complaint, and no issue was made between the
co-defendants. It was therefore held that the defendant Schwab
was not concluded by the judgment in Vilkinson's favor. So far
as the Bakula Case holds that, where one joint tort-feasor dis-
charges more than his equitable share of a liability resting upon
him and another joint tort-feasor by a single judgment, the ques-
tion of liability of the other joint tort-feasor to the plaintiff is
not res adjudicata, it must be and is modified."
A logical solution to the Bakida v. Schwab problem was ar-
rived at by Judge Fowler in Scharine v. Huebsch.s Here again
the original defendant appealed from a judgment awarding a
recovery to the plaintiff, but dismissing the former's cross com-
plaint against the impleaded concurrent tort-feasor. Again the
court was confronted with the task of adjusting rights which had
appeared irreconcilable to Judge Owen. On the one hand, "the
plaintiff, having recovered a judgment satisfactory to her, ought
not to be subjected to the expense and jeopardy of a new trial,
merely to enable the defendants to try out issues between them-
selves." On the other, if the impleader was to be given its pur-
ported effect, the determination of the questions of fact common
to the plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's right of recov-
brought in, judgment for plaintiff directed; upon payment thereof the original
defendant might recover one half thereof from his co-defendant.
ss(1931) 203 Wis. 261, 234 N. W. 358, followed in Brown v. Haertel,
(1933) 210 Wis. 354, 246 N. W. 691.
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cry over must be res adjudicata on the added party. The supreme
court affirmed the judgment in so far as it awarded recovery to
the plaintiff against the original defendant, and reversed its denial
of the latter's claim for contribution. Noting the fact that this
decision would "require entry of two judgments in a law action,
which is unusual, pcrhaps without precedent," Mr. Justice Fowler
states:
"But we see nothing in reason as distinguished from precedent
to prevent this .... The two issues, that between the plaintiff and
the defendant first sued, and that between the latter and the im-
pleaded defendant, really constitute two separate actions which
we permit to be litigated together in order to settle the whole con-
troversy by one trial."
He then points out that the inter-defendant issue should be liti-
gated subsequent to and without interfering with the finality of tile
determination of the principal controversy.
By safeguarding the plaintiff from unnecessary delay, expense
and hardship, these recent supreme court decisions have eliminated
the only serious practical objection to the impleader of additional
parties, and have done much to insure an increasing liberal,ty in
the trial courts.
I'EN NSYLVANIA
Probably the clearest and most far-reaching impleader provi-
sion is the Pennsylvania Scire Facias Act, enacted in 1929."' This
89 Pennsylvania, Act of Apr. 10, 1929 (P.L. 479) as amended June 22,
1931, (P.L. 663. No. 236). "An Act to regulate procedure where a de-
fendant desires to have joined, as additional defendants, persons whom lie
alleges are (alone liable or) liable over to him, or jointly or severally
liable with him, for the cause of action declared on, (and providing for
entry of judgments against such additional defendants).
"Be it enacted, Etc., That any defendant named in any action, may
sue out, as of course, a writ of scire facias to bring upon the record, as an
additional defendant, any other person alleged to be (alone liable or) liable
over to him for the cause of action declared on, or jointly or severally liable
therefor with him, with the same force and effect as if such other had been
originally sued; and (such original defendant shall have the same rights
in securing service of said writ as the plaintiff in the proceedings had for
service of process in said cause. Where it shall appear that an added
defendant is liable to the plaintiff, either alone or jointly with any other
defendant, the plaintiff may have verdict and judgment or other relief
against such additional defendant to the same extent as if such defendant
had been duly summoned by the plaintiff and the statement of claim had
been amended to include such defendant, and as if he had replied thereto
denying all liability.)
"(Upon the joinder of additional defendants under the terms of this
act), such suit shall continue, both before and after judgment, according to
equitable principles, although at common law or under existing statutes.
the plaintiff could not properly have joined all such parties as defendant,;."
Note-parts added by 1931 amendment in parenthesis.
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act was drafted and suggested by a special committee of the state
bar association,"0 for the express purpose of enlarging the
old common law device of "vouching in" to include all cases of
liability over, either by way of indemnity or contribution, and to
prevent the necessity of a separate suit for recovery over. "The
wording of the suggested statute has been made broad," reads the
1928 Report of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, ' "in order to
eliminate all questions of technical procedural rules of joinder.
The provision that the action shall proceed according to equitable
principles will permit the respective liabilities to be worked out
and an appropriate judgment or judgments to be entered, covering
the whole situation, without the bringing of separate suits."
The effectuation of this intended liberality is largely due to the
friendly and clear-sighted attitude of the Pennsylvania judiciary.
The lower courts were dubious at first as to the implication of the
new act,2 but with the Vinnacombe decision,"' the supreme court
effectually cleared away the haze surrounding it. Judge Simpson,
in that case, conceived the purpose of the statute as two-fold:
(1) "to avoid a multiplicity of suits; to compel every interested
person to appear and defend the action by plaintiff; and to save
the original defendant from possible harm resulting from loss of
evidence, as might result if compelled to await the end of the suit
before proceeding against those who were primarily liable in whole
or in part;"
and to leave the plaintiff's rights unaffected-
(2) "As to them the action proceeds against the original defen-
dant only, exactly as it would have done if the additional defen-
dants had not been named."
Again in First National Bank of Pittsburgh v. Baird" Judge
Simpson reiterated his holding in the Vinnaconibe decision, that
9OGilkey v. Montag, (1930) 13 D. &-C. (Pa.) 717, 718.9
'Pennsylvania, Bar Association 34th Annual Report (1928) pp. 42-44,
the report sets out examples of cases coming within the benefits of the
proposed statute.
The report also recommended (pp. 44-47) a rule clearly establishing
the right of contribution between all joint tort-feasors, which, unfortunate.y.
was not adopted.
92Cole v. National Casket Company, (1930) 101 Pa. Super. 207, after
added party in by scire facias, the trial judge, being evidently somewhat at
sea as to the procedure under the Scire Facias Act, held "a side bar con-
ference" with the counsel of all the parties where it was agreed to try the
suit as if the 'plaintiff had originally sued the defendants jointly.
93Vinnacombe v. Phil., (1929) 297 Pa. St. 564, 147 Atli. 826. City sued
for injuries due to defect in pavement, allowed to bring in tenant and
owner liable over to it for failure to make repairs.
04(1930) 300 Pa. St. 92, 150 At. 165.
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the adding of defendants by scire facias does not affect the rights
existing between the plaintiff and the original defendant. In that
case an accommodation maker was sued on a promissory note and
caused a scire facias to be issued against the one alleged to be
primarily liable. Pending the scire facias and the motion to quash
it, the court gave a judgment for the plaintiff against the maker
who had filed no affidavit of defense. The defendant appealed
from this judgment as prematurely entered, arguing that the pen-
dency of the scire facias proceedings prevented the plaintiff's
moving against the added party defendant. Mr. Justice Simpson
pointed out the patent absurdity of such a contention, in that the
defendant admittedly had no defense as against the plaintiff, and
had already been allowed 91 days instead of the customary 15 for
filing his affidavit. He declared that the plaintiff need not and
could not move for judgment against the added party-the third
party controversy being a strictly inter-defendant affair;"5 con-
cluding, "appellant's whole contention on this point is built on the
word 'defendants' in the clause 'additional defendants.' The legis-
lature might just as well have used the words 'third parties,' in
which event this supposed argument could not have been made.
What was intended is clear beyond cavil, and the use of the word
'defendants' does not make it less so .... The act was not passed
to hinder or delay a plaintiff, or to compel him to do impossible
or useless things, but only to give the defendant an immediate
remedy as against any other person alleged to be liable over for
the cause of action declared on, or jointly or severally liable there-
for with them."
Guided by Justice Simpson's keystone opinions, the lower
Pennsylvania courts have disposed of the various technical ques-
tions raised in connection with the new act in a clear and logical
manner, striking a very happy balance between the plaintiff's right
to a speedy and unincumbered trial and the interest of the defen-
dant, witnesses and court in the prevention of unnecessary litigation
or the double adjudication of common facts."" Contrast with
9 Note the 1931 amendment to the Scire Facias Act (note 93 supra)
provides "Where it shall appear that an added defendant is liable to the
plaintiff, either alone or jointly with any other defendant, the plaintiff may
have verdict and judqnzent or other relief against such additional defendant
to the same extent as if such defendant had been duly summoned by the
plaintiff and . . ." The effect to be given the new clause has not been
determined as yet. It is submitted that the result in cases like the Baird
Case should not be changed, especially since the plaintiff was asking for
no judgment against the added party.9 Connor v. Bank and Trust Company. (1930) 14 D. & C. (Pa.) 581,
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the Bakula v. Schwab decision that of the Pennsylvania superior
court in Moorhead Knitting Company v. Hartnan.9  There an
original defendant sought to have the plaintiff's judgment set aside
because of the trial court's error in refusing to have the jury in
the principal action sworn to try the issues between the original
defendant and a subcontractor brought in by scire facias. In
rejecting the defendaht's technical claim for reversal, Judge Gawth-
rop stated that the admitted error of the lower court had nothing
to do with the plaintiff's judgment, which was entirely separate
and distinct from the ancillary controversy, as to liability over,
between the two classes of defendants. Further, the judgment in
the principal controversy establishing the negligent handling of
plaintiff's goods was held to be binding on the inipleaded subcon-
tractor who had had an opportunity to appear and join in the
defense.
Under the 1929 scire facias act the Pennsylvania courts uni-
formly refused to allow the impleader of one alleged to be solely
liable, holding that such allegation, if true, would constitute a con-
plete defense for the original defendant, and no liability over or
joint and several liability could possibly exist." But a confession
bank sued by depositor for paying forged check allowed to bring in cor-
respondent bank indorsing the same; School Dist. of Eddystone v. Lewis.
(1930) 101 Pa. Super. 583, 588 (connected cases) contractor sued for ma-
terial furnished subcontractor permitted to implead subcontractor's bondsman
and take judgment against such party after the plaintiff's recovery against
him; Fisher v. Yellow Cab Company, (1931) 16 D. & C. (Pa.) 251, 252.
Controversies between plaintiff and defendant and impleaded party treated
as separate and distinct for purposes of Federal jurisdiction. Thus
diversity of citizenship existing between the defendant and third party
sufficient for issuance of scire facias, the plaintiff's citizenship being im-
material. Amando v. City of Philadelphia, (1931) 16 D. & C. (Pa.) 106.
added defendant allowed to issue writ of scire facias against party liable
over to him. Megargee v. City of Philadelphia, (1932) 16 D. & C. (Pa.)
588, 593, fifteen day limitation on issuance of scire facias relaxed, the court
quoting the Vinnacombe Case to effect that the act must be liberally
construed.
But see Shapiro v. Philadelphia, (1932) 306 Pa. St. 216, 159 At. 29,
refusal to allow issuance of scire facias versus a co-defendant against whom
a right of recovery over was asserted. Followed in Malone v. Union Paving
Co., (1932) 16 D. & C. (Pa.) 644.
97(1932) 105 Pa. Super. 166, 160 Atl. 223, merchandise damaged in
transit and hauling contractor sued for negligence.9SFolcroft Borough v. Lenhart, (1930) 15 D. & C. (Pa.) 535, 538,
writ of scire facias held to depend on primary liability of the original de-
fendant, plus existence of right of contribution or indennity; King v.
Equitable Gas Company, (1932) 307 Pa. St. 287, 161 At. 65; Shaw v.
Megargee, (1932) 307 Pa. St. 447, 161 Atl. 546, automobile collision case.
Held, scire facias should be quashed where basis wvas sole liability of other
driver defendant sought to bring in; Yellow Cab Company v. Gralmm,
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of primary liability was not a prerequisite, the writ being alter-
native in nature,9 and amendment was possible where the error
was merely one of pleading. 0 0 In 1931, the act was amended to
allow issuance of the writ on one alleged to be "alone liable."' 0 '
This was in line with the general plan to bring in all interested
parties and thresh out all matters in one suit. Yet it may be sub-
ject to criticism, in that it permits the defendant to bring in parties
against whom only the plaintiff has any claim should his (the orig-
inal defendant's) assertion of sole liability be well-founded. Might
not this privilege be more judiciously vested in the plaintiff alone?
CONCLUSION
Isadore H. Cohen'0 2 concludes that the success of the English
third party practice as contrasted with that of New York "is
obviously the result of the careful attention to detail reflected in
rules of interlocutory practice." The detail referred to, however,
relates solely to such formal and incidental matters as: form and
issuance of the third party notice, the time given the added party
to answer, procedure on and effect of default by the third
party, etc.
That all-important and much litigated question of what part
the impleaded party is to play and how far he is to be bound by
the adjudication in the principal controversy is very wisely placed
entirely and frankly in the discretion of the trial court, to be deter-
mined by the particular facts of each individual case. 1' 0 Granting
(C:C.A. 3rd Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 666; Gable v. Golder, (1930) 15 D.
& C. (Pa.) 55.
99Lex. v. Stove Company, (1931) 15 D. & C. (Pa.) 394; Gilkey v.
Montag, (1930) 13 D. & C. (Pa.) 717, 719.
10 oCohen v. Phil. Rural Transit (fompany, (1930) 13 D. & C. (Pa.) 465.
oQlSee note 89 supra-parts added in parenthesis. In Yellow Cab Co.
v. Rodgers, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 729, 730, on allegation of
"sole liability" of the impleaded party, the defendant was not permitted to
prove "joint and several liability or liability over." The advisable pro-
cedure, in case of doubt, is to allege both sole liability and liability over in
bringing in an added party.
10 2 Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendant's Rights Against
Third Parties, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 1147, 1181.
10 3 Order XVIa. rule 8, provides: "The court or Judge, upon the hear-
ing of the application for directions [provided for by rule 7] may. ij it
shall appear desirable to do so, give the third party liberty to defend the
action, either alone or jointly with the original defendant, npon such terms
as may appear just, or to appear at the trial and take such part therein as
may be just, and generally may order such proceedings to be taken, plead-
ings or documents to be delivered, or amendments to be made, and give
such directions as to the court or judge shall appear proper for having the
question of rights and liabilities of the parties most conveniently determined
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that the New York rules might be clarified considerably along
other lines suggested by Mr. Cohen, it is submitted that their
brevity is probably the one factor that has prevented their being
more completely enveloped in the fog of obtuse judicial technicality.
A comparison of the New York and English decisions indicates
thai the success of the English third party practice has been due,
not so much to the happier phraseology of their rules, as to the
understanding application of those rules by the courts. Again, in
Pennsylvania, the guiding opinions of Mr. Justice Simpson have
served to achieve and crystallize the true purpose of the scire
facias.104
The seeming penchant of the New York judiciary for definition
and classification of procedural rules is founded on a mistaken
conception of their function. Such rules were not formulated for
use as a sort of "I-Q block fitting test" to be applied to trial law-
.yers by the courts-the attorney under inspection being forced to
summarily determine which one of the pegs furnished exactly fits
his particular case. They were enacted as guides to "be operated
flexibly by wise administrators exercising wide discretion."
'
Viewing procedure as a tool, rather than as the finished product,
what end of justice can be said to have been subserved in the
Nichols Case and in the Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines
decision?
Turning more specifically to the problem at hand, certain
changes may be necessary in order to sweep away the maze of
technical distinctions with which the New York courts have sur-
rounded their impleader provisions. Again in those states which
and enforced and as to the mode and extent in or to which the third party
shall be bound or made liable by the decision or judgment in the action."
This rule is undoubtedly an improvement over the New York, \Vis-
consin and Pennsylvania provisions, in that it clearly declares that trial
convenience and expediency in the particular case, and not any purportedly
definite rules, are to serve as guides to the trial judge.
104Justice Simpson declares in First Nat'l Bank v. Baird, (1930) 300
Pa. St. 92, 100, 150 Atl. 165, that in interpreting any change in legal pro-
cedure, "the courts must accept the legislation as it is written, and apply
what it says despite the suggested difficulties, which, after all, are gen-
erally found to be more imaginary than real. The conservative bar
frequently prefers to perpetuate the prior procedure though it destroys the
statute; the courts, however, must give full effect to the statute, and must
alter that procedure to fit the new situation, created by the statute, when
they cannot co-exist." He concludes, p. 102 of opinion, "under friendly
interpretation, the statute [the scire facias act] may be made a beneficent
means of reaching justice speedily, and at a minimum of cost to litigants
and to the state."
10 Clark, The Cause of Action, (1934) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 354, 362.
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may enact such statutes in the future, certain safeguards as to
phraseology may help prevent their misinterpretation. To that
end the writer offers the following suggestions:
(1) It should be clearly shown that identity of all issues,
liability over by way of strict indemnity, a claim against the added
party for the entire claim in litigation, and maturity of the defen-
dant's claim through judgment and payment are not prerequisites
to impleader; but rather that it includes any case where a defen-
dant claims an ultimate right of recovery over, either in whole or
in part, which is dependent on substantial questions of fact to be
litigated in the original controversy.
(2) It should be directly stated that the new impleader prac-
tice carries with it the effect formerly acquired by "vouching in"
-that the decision in the principal controversy is res adjudicata
on the impleaded party as to facts common to both controversies;
but that in other respects the principal controversy (between the
plaintiff and original defendant) and the action for recovery over
(between the two classes of defendants) shall be kept separate and
distinct, the latter being litigated immediately subsequent to and
having no effect on the plaintiff's rights established in the former.
(3) The part the added party is to take in defending against
the plaintiff's claim should be frankly and completely left up to
the sound discretion of the trial court, guided by considerations of
expediency and trial convenience.
(4) If a provision like New York's 211a be enacted, purport-
ing to secure a right of contribution between joint and concurrent
tort-feasors, "it should expressly state that the required common
obligation is not joint judgment liability."' 0
Assuming the correctness of the above legislative suggestions,
they are offered with a full realization of the fact that no set of
rules can insure an effective third party practice. The final success
of any pleading reform depends upon its friendly interpretation
by a liberal judiciary. Trial court discretion, understandingly
exercised with a view to the promotion of administrative conveni-
ence, must supplant the fine spun disquisitions of the common law.
Nowhere is this more imperative than in determining what
part the added party is to play in the principal controversy. lere
the court must take cognizance of the two necessarily conflicting
interests: (1) The trial should be conducted with the least possible
106Charles 0. Gregory, in a very comprehensive article, Procedural
Aspects of Securing Tort Contribution in the Injured Plaintiff's Action,(1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 209, 243, sets out a model act based on a thorough
study of the problems involved, and comprehensive beyond the fondest pos-
sible dreams of Mr. Cohen. The proposed act is admirably phrased and
plugs up several of the loopholes found in section 211a, the only objection-
able feature being its completeness of procedural detail, which might afford
a "happy hunting ground" for technically minded attorneys and judges.
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prejudice to the plaintiff-his action should not be unnecessarily
impeded or delayed. (2) The third party should be allowed a
sufficient opportunity to protect his interests in regard to the ques-
tion of primary liability, to the end that he will be bound by the
facts adjudicated. Usually these two can be adjusted without any
severe hardship on either the plaintiff or the impleaded party. Any
slight inconvenience to them is clearly outweighed by the saving
in time and expense to the original defendant, witnesses and the
court. If, however, it is evident that either the plaintiff or the
third party will be seriously prejudiced, the impleader may be very
properly denied in the exercise of judicial discretion. These are
questions which can best be determined pragmatically with regard
to the particular facts of each case, not by rigid predetermined
rules involving the precise definition of such necessarily broad and
indefinite terms as "the cause of action," "added defendant," "lia-
bility over by way of indemnity."
